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ABSTRACT 
 
This article explores the psychological dimension of classical Sāṃkhya philosophy, on the basis of its 
canonical treatise, Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa (4th Century AD). The strong dualism defended by this 
ancient metaphysics establishes a division between what we will designate as the phenomenon of 
consciousness (puruṣa) and the cognitive phenomena (prakṛti). According to our approach, Sāṃkhya seems 
to offer a mechanical model of mind by means of an introspective self-research. In fact, we will argue that  in 
this system of thought, mind is regarded as an artificial extension of consciousness. Considering the 
Sāṃkhya classical treatise as the report of a meditative experience, our main purpose is to examine some key 
points of this dualism. To this end, we also take account of certain Western theories of mind, as well as 
certain aspects included in another Indian philosophy greatly influenced by the Sāṃkhya system, namely, the 
classical Yoga of Patañjali. 
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RESUMEN  Conciencia y cognición en la metafísica del Sāṃkhya clásico 
 
En este escrito abordamos el Sāṃkhya clásico desde una perspectiva psicológica y no cosmológica, 
basándonos en su texto canónico, las Sāṃkhykārikā de Īśvarakṛṣṇa (s.IV d.C.) El fuerte dualismo sāṃkhyano 
establece un límite tajante entre el fenómeno de la conciencia (puruṣa) y el fenómeno de la cognición 
(prakṛti). En nuestra opinión, la filosofía Sāṃkhya parece ofrecer un modelo mecánico de la mente a partir 
de un análisis introspectivo basado, exclusivamente, en la auto-indagación. De hecho, en este artículo vamos 
a defender que en este sistema de pensamiento, la mente es considerada una extensión artificial de la 
conciencia. Entendiendo el tratado clásico del Sāṃkhya como un informe fruto de una experiencia 
meditativa, nuestro propósito es profundizar en ciertos puntos clave de este dualismo. Con este fin, 
tendremos en cuenta ciertas teorías occidentales de la mente, así como  aspectos presentes en otra filosofía 
india, muy influida por el sistema sāṃkhyano, a saber, el Yoga clásico de Patañjali. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: cognición; conciencia; dualismo; experiencia; Teoría de la Mente Extendida;  
meditación; Sāṃkhya; Yoga 
 
 
The Cosmos of Human Experience 
Set down among Hindus [Jesus] would have made use of the concepts of Samkhya […] the idea of 
'life' as an 'experience' stands opposed to his mind to every sort of word, formula, law, belief and 
dogma. 
 
F. Nietzsch 
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The purpose of this paper is to analyse some important features of Sāṃkhya philosophy in its 
classical version, as it has been formulated by Īśvarakṛṣṇa (4th Century AD) in his treatise 
Sāṃkhyakārikā or The stanzas on Sāṃkhya (SK). These stanzas present Sāṃkhya philosophy as an 
enumeration of twenty-five principles named tattva. P.S. Filliozat (1988:98) translates tattva as 
“essence” in French, while Mrinal Kaul (2018:240) or Mikel Burley (2012:47) offer a more literal 
translation, “thatness”, in order to emphasize that the Sanskrit word 'tattva' refers to the character of 
that (tat). The Sāṃkhya schema starts with the association (saṃyoga) of two main tattvas or 
“essential categories”, both eternal and independent of each other, named puruṣa and prakṛti, which 
we will leave, at present, without translation. The other twenty-three categories are the 
manifestations of the second one, that is to say, they are the perceptible body of prakṛti. Most of 
these tattvas evoke a deeply psychological aspect (e.g. buddhi: intellect or intentional 
consciousness; ahaṃkāra: ego or self-affirmation etc). The strong dualism of this schema permits 
us to reduce the twenty-five categories to two, given that the principal aim of this philosophy is to 
discern what is prakṛti from what is not prakṛti, or conversely, what is puruṣa from what is not 
puruṣa. Even though many of the tattva seem to function as psychological categories, related to the 
inner and subjective experience of the individual (i.e. his or her mental and sentient life), many 
scholars consider that the Sāṃkhya schema describes the origin and development of both individual 
and world, in an objective way. The more extended interpretation presents Sāṃkhya philosophy as a 
dualist, rationalistic, quasi-materialistic and realistic cosmology, connected, in addition, with a 
certain kind of atheism. G. J. Larson and R. N. Battacharya (1987:6) in their encyclopaedic work 
about Sāṃkhya tells us that this system can be understood “psychologically and/or cosmologically”, 
and Lakshmi Kapani conceives Sāṃkhya theory as a “cosmogenesis” described in psychological 
terms, that is: “the cosmogenesis is a psychogenesis” (1992:412). G.J. Larson explores the main 
interpretations of Sāṃkhya during the 19th and 20th centuries in his famous work Classical sāṃkhya 
(1969), in which we can find different models of this standard cosmological approach. All these 
interpretations are indebted to medieval Indian commentaries on the Sāṃkhyakārikā and other later 
texts, already influenced by ideas related to Vedantic philosophy, as is the case of the treatise 
Sāṃkhyasūtras (17th century AD). Nevertheless, the cosmological interpretation of classical 
Sāṃkhya has often been assumed systematically in an uncritical way, leaving without solution a 
great number of problems and explanatory gaps. To mention but one, in the first verse of 
Sāṃkhyakārikā, Sāṃkhya is pictured as a method whose main goal is to teach human beings how to 
break free from suffering once and for all (cf. SK 1). However, it seems difficult to explain this 
soteriological aim if we accept that Sāṃkhya represents a mere exposition of the origin and 
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evolution of the cosmos. As Mikel Burley argues, it is hard to believe that any cosmological 
explanation can “assist us in overcoming suffering and dissatisfaction” (2012:6). From our point of 
view the cosmological interpretation of Sāṃkhya must always include the psychological side in 
order to be coherent with its soteriological character. Even if some authors, such as N.N. 
Battacharya (2005:30), suggest that this soteriological goal is not an original element of Sāṃkhya, 
but a latter addition, the fact is that the classical treatise of Īśvarakṛṣṇa begins by stating its purpose 
of liberation. 
 In 1898, Satish Chandra Banerji (not a well-known author), published a Sāṃkhyakārikā 
translation -with commentary- of Gauḍapāda (6th-7th AD) and Nārāyana Tirtha (17th 18th AD). In the 
introduction to this work, Banerji warns us that Kapila -considered the founder of Sāṃkhya- “does 
not pretend, any more than any other accurate thinker, to explain how there came to be a world at all 
(in its ultimate abstraction); he confines himself to the more modest, but perhaps more important, 
question, how there comes to be a world for us?” (1898:28). Afterwards, Banerji adds: “What 
Kapila was leading with is not objective creation, but subjective. Philosophy with him, as we have 
indicated before, is strictly a re-thinking of experience” (1898:46). Going beyond that, Banerji 
suggests a possible comparison between Kapila and Kant's epistemologies. Recently, Mikel Burley 
(2012) has proposed a phenomenological reading of Sāṃkhya philosophy, thereby making use of 
Kantian philosophy. Thus, Burley considers Sāṃkhya and Yoga as “metaphysics of experience”: 
My main thesis is that there exist some serious problems in the ways that Sāṃkhya and Yoga 
have commonly been interpreted, and that these problems derive primarily from what I regard 
as a false assumption, namely that, in presenting their metaphysical doctrines, the Indian 
systems are concerned with giving an account of how the universe is […] independently of 
anyone's experiencing it. (Burley, 2012:5) 
  
 In his work, Classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga, Burley intends to refute or, at least to challenge, 
certain key points of Sāṃkhya standard interpretation, especially with regard to the cosmological 
and objectivist approach under which this philosophy used to be considered. In the context of this 
paper not only will we contemplate the psychological dimension of classical Sāṃkhya, but also we 
will consider it as a philosophy of introspective experience. According to our approach, Sāṃkhya 
schema represents a symbolic map of meditation in which are registered several structures of human 
subjectivity. Furthermore, it is a map with pedagogical purposes since it seeks to point out the 
different steps that should lead each individual to attain the main goal: the liberating isolation 
(kaivalya) of the consciousness. The twenty-five categories exhibited by the Sāṃkhya schema could 
represent, in the words of Burley (2012:131): “a report of meditative experience, an exposition of 
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the insights gained into the nature of the mind and its processes during states of samādhi”1. This 
author adds: “Feuerstein, for example, talks of 'ontogenetic models' as 'originally and primarily 
maps for meditative introspection, intended to guide the yogin in his exploration of the terra 
incognita of the mind'” (2012:132). Thus, the Sāṃkhya proposes the applied study of the 
enumerated categories of the schema, in order to obtain the discrimination knowledge (jñāna) that 
leads to the isolation of consciousness. This enables us to appreciate, in a more intelligible way, the 
two different meanings of the word 'sāṃkhya' reflected by its etymology. On the one hand, this term 
seems to have come from the Sanskrit noun 'saṃkhya' (number) and thus to become an adjective 
with the meaning of “numeral, enumerative”. On the other hand, it could derive from the verbal 
stem 'khyā' -which forms the term 'khyāti' (knowledge)- with the addition of the prefix 'sam' 
(evoking the idea of “completeness”), resulting in the meaning of “thorough discernment” or “total 
knowledge” (Banerji, 1898:50; Larson, 2017:1-2; Burley, 2012:191; Villegas, 2016:15). Leaving 
aside the cosmological dimension of classical Sāṃkhya, we cannot accept the presumed 
materialism ascribed to it by standard interpretation, since we will not translate the word “prakṛti” 
as “matter”, not even as “subtle matter”. On the other hand, in the Sāṃkhyakārikā nothing is said on 
the existence or non-existence of God, contrary to what some authors have claimed on the basis of 
latter commentaries and not of the text itself (see Tola and Dragonetti, 2008:645). Thus, to claim 
that classical Sāṃkhya is an atheist philosophy remains as questionable as to hold the contrary. 
However, what seems certain is that God is absent from the Sāṃkhya schema and does not play any 
role in the classical text of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Concerning the question whether Sāṃkhya is a realistic or 
idealistic philosophy, we consider, like Banerji, that this metaphysics does not focus on ontological 
issues and that leads us to hold that Sāṃkhya proposes a method of liberation addressed to a real 
individuals, affected by a real dissatisfaction in a real and not illusory world. Therefore, we will 
maintain, at least provisionally, the thesis of Sāṃkhya realism. 
 In the following pages we will explain how the meditator should conceive the phenomena of 
his mind according to Sāṃkhya. It is important to remark that its conception of mental life is the 
result of an introspective investigation, and, thereby, it is based on the first-person perspective. This 
means that Sāṃkhya is not only a philosophy of subjective experience but its exclusive method of 
research is also subjective, that is to say, it involves a self-research. A similar perspective was 
adopted by Descartes in order to support his mind-body dualism, even thought we are inclined to 
think that the Sāṃkhya method employs meditation techniques rather than intellectual or 
                                                 
1 The term “Samādhi”, usually rendered as “meditative absorption”, represents the last step in the eightfold path of Yoga 
proposed by Patañjali. 
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contemplative self-reflectiveness. In the context of cognitive philosophy, Cartesian dualism, even in 
its secular and non-theological version, has been refuted, criticized and contested from many fronts. 
In fact, it could be argued that any explicit dualist model is unlikely to boast friends in the field of 
contemporary cognitive philosophy, even if, at the end of the day, it seems impossible not to 
succumb to any type of duality. As Jerry Fodor, one of the most important philosophers of mind, 
said: “If there's anything we philosophers really hate it's an untenable dualism […] They (the 
dualisms, not the philosophers) are insidious, and they are ubiquitous; perpetual vigilance is 
required” (Fodor, 2009:13). In this regard, the Theory of Extended Mind (TEM) proposed by Andy 
Clark and David Chalmers in 1998, intended to eliminate the mind-world dualism, holding that in 
certain circumstances, some objects such as, for example, a notebook, a smartphone, or a simple 
sheet of paper and a pencil, form part of our cognitive process, not in a passive but in an active way. 
That is: according to this theory, if certain general conditions are fulfilled, we can say that our mind 
extends to the world, hence the world becomes a part of our mind. This “active externalism”, as the 
authors named it, seems to be a quite modest externalism, if we compare it with other theories 
which emphasize those processes of cognition which take place in the dynamic interaction between 
mind, body and (social) environment. Today, this long discussion about the intra or extra-cranial 
frontiers of our cognition still remains open (Adams & Aizawa, 2001; Piredda, 2017). Returning to 
the Sāṃkhya philosophy, this ancient metaphysics challenges us towards a particular kind of 
duality, considerably different from Cartesian dualism. Sāṃkhya dualism is more “insidious” and 
“ubiquitous” given that it does not establish a strong division between individual and world or 
between mind and body, but instead opens a frontier inside the individual as such. We could say, 
metaphorically, that Sāṃkhya philosophy distinguishes two separate rooms in the scenario of our 
inner life: the first room observes while the second one is observed. The former is always quiet, 
clean and empty while the later is always crowded, full of a dynamic variety of contents and, 
roughly speaking, does not know how to keep silence since to make noise is its natural function. 
The pristine and always isolated space symbolizes consciousness while the chaotic one represents 
our mental and sentient life. Consequently, according to this Indian metaphysics, if we stopped to 
observe thoroughly our mental life, we would realize that it is not a life at all, but a mechanical and 
functional process external to consciousness, which is the only possible subject of experience. From 
this perspective, it is as if Sāṃkhya philosophy would conceive the cognitive activity as an 
extension itself, namely: an artificial extension of consciousness. But, we might well wonder: does 
not cognition involve consciousness? In fact, since the only subject of experience that Sāṃkhya 
recognizes is consciousness, cognition must involve consciousness. Furthermore: cognition 
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performs due to consciousness. However, holding this position does not prevent Sāṃkhya from 
considering that both phenomena are totally different in nature. In order to explain this counter-
intuitive idea, we will also have recourse to classical Yoga philosophy on the basis of its 
foundational text, the Yogasūtra (YS) or “verses of Yoga” attributed to Patañjali (2nd -5th century 
CE). In spite of the fact that this classical treatise is earlier than Īśvarkṛṣṇa's text, it is undeniable 
that underlying the classical Yoga of Patañjali an important metaphysical vision exists, strongly 
related to Sāṃkhya philosophy. In fact, classical Yoga preserves the Sāṃkhya dualism between 
puruṣa and prakṛti, and, as Òscar Pujol have claimed (2009:48), all the meditative methods of 
Patañjali aim to separate mind from consciousness. Therefore, both these philosophies share a 
common goal: the definitive isolation of consciousness that is called kaivalya. 
 
The Birth and Dissolution of Experience 
CLOV: Nature has forgotten us. 
HAMM: There's no more nature. 
CLOV: No more nature! You exaggerate. 
 
S. Beckett 
 
As we have already noted, the starting point of the Sāṃkhya schema is the association (saṃyoga) of 
the two main substances, puruṣa and prakṛti avyakta (i.e. imperceptible prakṛti). As the result of the 
proximity of both principles, prakṛti becomes visible, deploying itself through a large spectrum of 
twenty-three manifested categories. These twenty-three tattvas represent the cognitive system of a 
human being as it is experienced by him or her. Several stanzas of Sāṃkhyakārikā (see SK 3,22,24) 
explain the conditioning role that some tattvas play over others, as for example, in the case of the 
role of the intellect (buddhi) over the ego (ahaṃkāra), and the role of the latter over the “mental 
synthesis” (manas2), but also the role of the former over the sense and motor skills with which the 
data of experience is recorded. By means of introspective research, Sāṃkhya philosophy postulates 
that the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa), composed of three elements, namely: 1) Intellect 2) Self-
affirmation or ego, and 3) Mind or “mental synthesis”, heads the cognitive processes, by 
synthesizing, recognizing, and determining the scattered information provided by the senses. 
Therefore, we can start pointing out that the cognitive phenomenon seems to come under the 
category of prakṛti. However, according to Sāṃkhya, if we really want to overcome suffering, it is 
crucial for us to learn to discern prakṛti from puruṣa. But what do these two categories mean? 
                                                 
2 The term manas is usually rendered as “mind”. We borrow from Mikel Burley (2012) the conception of manas as an 
internal mechanism of synthesis that filters out the information provided by the senses. 
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 The Sanskrit term “puruṣa” means literally “man” or “human being”, and its plural, 
“puruṣāḥ” designates humanity. “Apauruṣa”, for instance, with the negative prefix, refers to the 
superhuman that transcends the human. In order to offer some historical references, in the Vedic 
saṃhitā, Puruṣa is represented as the prototype of the first man, a demiurge who is sacrificed by the 
Vedic gods and from whose sacrifice Cosmos is born (RV X,90). But in the last texts of the 
Upaniṣads, the meaning of “puruṣa” becomes more introspective and less cosmic. As a matter of 
fact, in upaniṣadic literature puruṣa starts to function as a spiritual principle located in the centre of 
our Self (madhya ātmani; Kaṭha  Upaniṣad, 2.1.10), in a hidden cavity or secret place (nihitam 
guhāyām; Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, 2.1.10). One of the more ancient upaniṣadic texts, the 
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, explains the etymology of “puruṣa” as compounded by the noun 'purva' 
(“origin”) and the past participle 'auṣat' (“destroyed, burden”; from the verbal stem 'uṣ'; 
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 1.4.1). Certainly, the etymology offered by this upaniṣad could be in 
harmony with a symbolism of a timeless presence, beyond death, with no beginning and no end. 
Therefore, it is quite normal to find the term “puruṣa” translated as “soul” in English, “esprit” in 
French or “espíritu” in Spanish. But, concerning Sāṃkhya and Yoga philosophies, the current 
translation has left this theological terminology behind, in order to better reflect the psychological 
content of both systems of thought. Today it is quite natural to translate “puruṣa” as “pure 
consciousness”, that is to say, a non-intentional consciousness, devoid of all content. As Larson 
defines it: “The puruṣa is simply the fact of consciousness” (2017:199). In certain aphorisms, 
Patañjali employs the term “draṣṭṛ” (lit. “one who sees”) referring to puruṣa (YS 1.3). Òscar Pujol 
claims that this observer “is as an all-seeing eye, that's why it is called 'witness' or 'witnessing 
consciousness'” (2016:57). The Sāṃkhyakārikā describes an isolated (kaivalya) puruṣa, whose real 
nature is to be an observer (draṣṭṛ), impartial (mādhyastha), and inactive (akartṛ) witness (sākṣin), 
(SK 19). Thus, puruṣa involves the presence of an unalterable consciousness, immune to the 
miscellaneous and fluctuating contents of prakṛti, that is to say, immune to the mental instrument 
and to its operations. According to Sāṃkhya, consciousness has not been produced, nor does it have 
the capacity to produce (na prakṛtiḥ na vikṛth puruṣaḥ; SK 3), but, nonetheless, it is the triggering 
factor of prakṛti's manifestation. The cognitive and sensory phenomenon represented by the twenty-
three manifested categories takes place due to the presence of consciousness.  
 Let us turn now to the second category of this particular dualism. The translation of the term 
“prakṛt” seems to us a key point, given that it can determine the way we understand the Sāṃkhya 
schema. If we follow the standard interpretation, and hence we translate prakṛti as “matter”, we 
might need to accept that Sāṃkhya understood cognitive and sentient processes as “material” in 
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contrast with the immaterial or “spiritual” presence of consciousness. Effectively, it is quite normal 
to translate “prakṛti” as “nature” (Larson, 2017:10; Banerji, 1898:), “materiality” (Larson, 1987:49) 
or “matter” (Garbe, 1892:22; Villegas, 2016:16), and, thus, to conceive Sāṃkhya as a “sui generis 
materialism” (Tola and Dragonetti, 2008:542). However, the term “prakṛt” comes from the verbal 
stem 'kṛ' (“doing”), to which is added the prefix 'pra', which commonly before a verb acquires the 
sense of “forward”. As a verb, the form “prakṛ” means “to produce”: thereby, the form “prakṛti” is a 
noun that would mean literally “the producer”. Undoubtedly, “matter” is a legitimate translation of 
the word “prakṛti”, as “soul” is also a legitimate translation of the term “puruṣa”. In our view, it is 
the context in which these words are used that should determine what is the most appropriate 
translation. Mikel Burley is one of the few scholars who have tried to show that to understand 
prakṛti as “matter” has led to misleading conceptions which have conditioned the hermeneutic 
tradition of Sāṃkhya: 
 […] those who adopt a materialist interpretation of prakṛti tend to fall far short of explaining 
what they mean by 'matter' or 'material', and consequently end up using apparently paradoxical 
expression to refer to certain of prakṛti's modes, such as 'mental material principles' (Jacobsen 
1999:225), without giving us any good reason to regard these expressions as anything other than 
nonsense. (Burley, 2012:115) 
 
 In their conception of Sāṃkhya as “rational cosmology”, some authors, such as Juan Arnau, 
suggests a timid parallelism between the category of non-manifested prakṛti and the “dark matter” 
or even the “antimatter” of modern physics (Arnau, 2013:61). We agree with Mikel Burley that the 
risk of representing prakṛti as “matter” is that this concept could be erroneously associated “with 
the scientific usage of the term to denote the physical stuff […] of which the whole material 
universe is composed” (2012:97). We do not pretend to state here, once and for all, what prakṛti, in 
its both manifested and non-manifested faces, could mean in the Sāṃkhya context. What seems to 
be clear is that if we focus on the categories of the schema, the manifestation of prakṛti is related to 
the manifestation of subjective and psychological categories which become active and visible in the 
presence of consciousness. This is because, following the Sāṃkhyakārikā, the “producer element” 
or prakṛti, under which mental phenomena fall is unconscious (acetanam) and incapable of 
discernment (aviveka). Finally, when consciousness succeeds in isolating itself completely from it 
(i.e. from cognitive-sensory phenomenon), the latter would become invisible again, and thereby, all 
the manifested categories would disappear (SK 65-66). At that moment, the individual attains 
liberation, usually called kaivalya. According to Sāṃkhya, that unalterable and witnessing 
consciousness represents the true identity of an individual, even if we do not manage to discern the 
difference between our mental processes (cittavṛttis) and the impassive, which remains an isolated 
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eye that observes them and enables them to function. Sāṃkhya invites the meditators to understand 
their own mental life as something that occurs outside them, that is to say, as a foreign process, 
despite the radical closeness of the experience. Furthermore, this metaphysics invites us to continue 
our self-research towards the final presence that sustains and makes possible all those mental 
contents. Therefore, it seems as if our mental life was an extension of us: as long as we are involved 
in it we will be at the doors of ourselves, exposed to experience, and thereby, to suffering.  
The postulation of two main categories stems from the basic and natural observation that in 
order to experience there needs to be both a subject and an object; in attempting to explain the 
experience itself, it is quite logical that both, the experimenter and the experienced, preside over the 
explanation. As Satish Chandra Banerji has claimed: “Kapila […] saw that experience implied two 
factors, a knower and the known. […] The knower Kapila called Soul [puruṣa], the known Nature 
[prakṛti]. What the ultimate character of either is he does not enquire, he has no desire of 
transgressing into the province of the cosmogonist” (1898:29). According to our interpretation, we 
would say that Kapila called the knower “consciousness” (puruṣa) and the known, the “producer 
element”, seems to be closely related to our cognitive activities. On the one hand, we have this 
witnessing consciousness, which is pure vision (dṛśi śuddha ) but is also lame (paṅgu), incapable of 
carrying out its will by itself. On the other hand, not only is there a producer and active element, but 
also other elements, mechanical, blind (andha) and unconscious (acetanam). Their proximity 
(saṃyoga) represents the emergence or the origin (saṃyoga tatkṛtah sargaḥ, SK 21) neither of the 
world, nor of the human being, but of the conscious experience of the world, of the others, and of 
course, of ourselves. As a result of this association between the subject (puruṣa) and the instrument 
of experience (prakṛti), confusion will arise, since the individual will inevitably identify with 
prakṛti. This erroneous self-conception will be the real root of suffering. Suddenly, it will seem that 
the unconscious instrument, prakṛti, is actually the consciousness (acetam cetnavad iva lingam) and 
that puruṣa as impassive (udāsīna) witness is an active part of the game. Thus, there occurs a 
subjective illusion of a role reversal, because all experience needs full cooperation between both 
categories in terms of an immediate fusion, in which subject and instrument appear to lose their 
mutual limits. Experience (bhoga) has been defined by Patañjali as the confusion between mind and 
consciousness (sattvapuruṣayoḥ), that is to say, as the inability to discern mental processes from the 
witnessing presence that sustains them (cf. YS 3.35). This association between consciousness and 
mind involves, however, a condition sine qua non for the emergence and development of 
experience. Commenting on this association, Vācaspati Miśra will claim: “the embryo of the 
mistake is the union, that is to say, the proximity” (Bhrāntibījam tat saṃyogas tat sannidhānam; 
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STK 20). In our opinion, the liberating isolation (kaivalya) of consciousness that Sāṃkhya and 
Yoga propose to us involves, inevitably, the dissolution of experience itself, and consequently the 
removal of the dissatisfaction and confusion associated with it. Once all mental processes have 
stopped and all that remains is the identification with this empty consciousness, what happens is the 
abolition of experience in terms of return and isolation. We can hardly speak of an empty 
consciousness experiencing itself. In this situation there is no duality able to establish the 
indispensable relation between a subject and object; there is no longer someone experiencing 
something. In other words, by means of the isolation, the experimenter would be the only content of 
the experienced, and, in turn, the experienced would be the only subject of experience, in absolute 
terms. Without the corresponding distance between a subject and an object, we cannot talk of 
experience. But, according to Sāṃkhya, this isolation is not possible without the practice (abhyāsa) 
of the tattvas represented in the schema (tattvābhyāsa; SK 65). The meditator has to learn to 
observe the mechanicity of prakṛti, the unconsciousness intrinsic to the mental processes which 
multiply themselves following an unlimited pattern of activity. Apart from this process which seems 
to have a life of its own, there is the empty presence of the meditator who, in order to learn to 
discern has to purify the chaos of his or her intellect. In fact, the intellect (buddhi), defined as 
“ascertainment” (adhyavasāyah; SK 23), appears to play an exceptional role in the Sāṃkhya 
philosophy, since there seems to exist a double and “secret” communication between consciousness 
and intellect. Also, this particular communication is reflected in Yogasūtra: “the unalterable 
consciousness (citer apratisaṃkramāyās) [obtains] the perception of its own intellect, spreading its 
form on it” (tadākārāpattau svabuddhisaṃvedanam; YS, 4.21). As Larson (2017:183) points out, 
the intellect shares with the consciousness a unique characteristic: both are individual but not 
personal, since they are prior to the emergence of the ego (ahaṃkāra). Thus, in order to achieve the 
total isolation of consciousness, the cognitive instrument must be firstly purified of chaotic 
contents, and thus become a mirror where consciousness may find nothing else but the reflection of 
its pure presence. 
  
Mechanical Cognition and Isolated Consciousness 
Given that consciousness contemplates itself through the intellect, an exercise based on a detached 
observation of one’s mind is required in order to obtain the discriminative knowledge (jñāna). First 
of all, it is necessary to be able to discern the mechanicity of our mind, that is to say its patterns of 
function. Prakṛti is the name given to the three mental properties called guṇa (lit. “thread”, 
“strand”). More specifically, mental life is explained, in a reductionist analysis, as a mechanical 
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interaction between the three simplest phenomenological mental states, that is: the guṇa called 
sattva whose nature is joy (prīti), the guṇa named rajas whose essence is dissatisfaction (aprīti), and 
the guṇa tamas whose nature is obfuscation and confusion (viṣāda). According to Sāṃkhyakārikā,  
joy is related to the function of  manifestation, suffering is associated with the task of actions, while 
obfuscation is connected to the role of limitation (SK 12). Thus, these three functions, 
manifestation, action and limitation, counterbalance each other, giving rise to the cognitive dynamic 
modus operandi, and strongly determining the degree of mental stability. A stable intellect (sattvic) 
favours the manifestation of consciousness, giving rise to certain psychological patterns (i.e. the 
four positive bhāva; SK 44). Instead, a tamasic intellect, confused and saturated with information, 
will veil the presence of consciousness, giving rise to other, different kinds of psychological 
patterns (i.e. the four negative bhāva; SK 45). Furthermore, in the background of every mental state, 
however complex it may be, there is an underlying specific combination of these three simplest 
phenomenological states: joy, dissatisfaction and obfuscation. Mental processes are designed to 
function mechanically, working together as a team, in virtue of the trigunic interaction and 
combination. Actually, this dynamic interaction and continued imbalance is what the manifested 
face of prakṛti represents, and thus, the way in which Sāṃkhya philosophy describes our cognitive 
operations. As we have already noticed, the different manifested tattvas of the schema also maintain 
a hierarchical relation among themselves: the intellect rules over the ego, and the ego rules over the 
mental organ of synthesis, just as over the five senses, the five capacities of action and the formal 
impressions gathered from experience. All these essential pieces of the map have their respective 
functions in order to process, successfully, the data of the experience (SK 23-38). We cannot modify 
the relation established between all these categories, without changing the identity of the Sāṃkhya 
schema or the core of the Sāṃkhya system. This sphere of prakṛti behaves as the indispensable tool 
that the consciousness or puruṣa requires in order to experience or to know, observing what 
emerges from the intellect's mirror. Therefore, by employing an introspective approach, Sāṃkhya 
describes our mental life in a functionalist way, that is, on the basis of the role played by each piece 
of the system and the mechanical relationship that the manifested tattvas maintain with each other. 
It could be said that, making use of strictly subjective criteria, Sāṃkhya metaphysics offers a 
functional model of mind. The idea which says that mind is an object devoid of own life, is an 
important feature that Sāṃkhya could inherit from upaniṣadic literature. In the ancient metaphysics 
of some Upaniṣads, mind is regarded as a mere mechanical object: “who does impel the mind to 
grasp [the objects]?” (keneṣitaṃ patati preṣitam manaḥ; Kena Upaniṣad. 1.1). From this angle, 
what Descartes establishes applying his “methodical doubt” is not just the existence of a thinking 
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“thing” (what he will finally call “I”) but the fact that this particular “thing” cannot stop thinking. In 
the context of Cartesian philosophy, being is reduced immediately to the faculty of thought, setting 
up a common identity between being and thinking. However, the above-mentioned upaniṣadic 
question leads us from Cartesian existential inquiry to the classical concern of several Indian 
metaphysics about the underlying essence behind each existent thinking subject. Nevertheless, what 
it seems clear is that Sāṃkhya metaphysics invites us to observe our cognitive processes and mental 
contents as if they were external events, not associated with the consciousness that makes it 
possible. It is hard to believe that the task proposed can be accomplished only by means of a simple 
reflection, that is to say, by employing precisely our own mental mechanisms. However, bringing 
order to the intellect requires, to begin with, an important mental exercise of self-observation as 
well as a reasonable management of our mental contents. 
 In the contemporary horizon of cognitive philosophy, it is still under discussion whether 
cognition involves consciousness or not. Thus, there is no consensus on whether it is possible to 
explain the cognition process in a satisfactory manner, leaving the problem of consciousness 
outstanding (Piccinini, 2009:12). As Ned Block argues, there is still an “explanatory gap” when it 
comes to giving an account of the relation between mental operations and phenomenal 
consciousness: “We have no conception of our physical or functional nature that allow us to 
understand how it could explain our subjective experience” (1998:377). It is fully acknowledged 
that mechanical models of mind offered by cognitive philosophy, are not able to explain the 
subjective character of experience (Varela and Thompson, 1997:17). However, Sāṃkhya is a 
subjective pre-scientific analysis of mind, which only takes into account the lived experience. Thus, 
while it offers a mechanical model of mind, it also describes consciousness as an island capable of 
transcending experience. Precisely, its main task is to lead us to that island or, it would be better to 
say, to remind us that we are already that island. What it is clear is that in the horizon of Sāṃkhya 
philosophy, this “isolated consciousness” it is not an obvious mere feature of a mental life. On the 
contrary, consciousness plays a definitive role since it is the determining factor for cognitive 
processes. Consciousness is also the only subject of experience as long as it takes place. Once 
liberation is attained, the experience is dissolved, but the dualism still remains, because prakṛti's 
substance never disappears: it merely becomes invisible again. According to Sāṃkhya, therefore, 
cognition represents a phenomenon whose manifestation or concealment is driven by “the all-seeing 
eye” of consciousness.  
In addition, many contradictions have been attributed to Sāṃkhya philosophy for what 
seems to us a common misunderstanding, namely the tendency to consider that the empirical 
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subject, the practitioner or the person, is synonymous with puruṣa. Consciousness is the 
transcendental identity of human beings. But the empirical beings, -the incarnated individuals-, are 
the meeting place between prakṛti and puruṣa. Taking this nuance into consideration can prevent us 
from considering that Sāṃkhya understands that human beings are impassive subjects, devoid of 
any moral responsibility, as defended by certain authors (see Ranganathan, 2017: 266). In fact, SK 
44 and 46 show that Sāṃkhya does take into account certain moral aspects, such as virtue, 
generosity or being surrounded by good companies, but all of them fall on the side of prakṛti. For 
practical purposes, this issue is not relevant: the practitioner is clearly recognized as a moral agent, 
although this dharmic feature is attributed to his cognitive part.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
Dealing with the historical origins of Yoga philosophy, Geoffrey Samuel claims: “The yogic 
practitioner is less concerned with the ontology of 'Spirit' (puruṣa) and 'matter' (prakṛti) than with 
the development of yogic states and the consequent inner transformation or reversal” (2008:223). 
On our side, we have pointed out that Sāṃkhya dualism may be also less concerned with this or any 
ontology, than with the phenomenological division between the mind and the consciousness. In fact, 
restoring the psychological dimension of Sāṃkhya metaphysics seems to us a key point in order to 
explain its relation with Patañjali's Yoga. Precisely on the grounds of its counter-intuitive 
conclusions, we do not consider that what Sāṃkhya offers is a mere speculative model of mind, but 
a meditative map based on an exhaustive work of self-exploration. For this reason, we cannot agree 
with Ian Whicher (1998:55) when he states that one of the differences between classical Yoga and 
Sāṃkhya is that "Patañjali's philosophy, however, is not based upon mere theoretical or speculative 
knowledge”. In our opinion, both philosophies have their primary source in experience and none  is 
based merely on abstract thinking. From this perspective, there are two different levels inside of our 
inner life and the Sāṃkhya schema seeks to aid us in discerning which one is really essential, and 
which one is external. In other words: which one is the observer and which one the blind person, 
which one enjoys freedom and which one behaves in a mechanical way. For us it is clear that the 
isolation of consciousness proposed by Sāṃkhya, at least in its definitive version (i.e. the absolute 
kaivalya; SK68), involves the total dissolution of experience. Both categories, experience (bhoga) 
and liberation (kaivalya or mokṣa), seem to be incompatible in this philosophy, since suffering is 
regarding by Īśvarakṛṣṇa as the intrinsic nature (svābhāva) of experience (SK 55). As Banerji says: 
“We must transcend experience if we are to escape pain” (1898:24). Similarly, in her commentaries 
on Sāṃkhyakārikā, Laia Villegas claims: “Suffering only can disappear if we transcend the 
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existence itself” (2016:164). Moreover, the dualistic Śivaism of Sadyojyoti (9th century CE), very 
influenced by Sāṃkhya doctrine, considers that experience and liberation are even opposed 
categories. In the first stanza of his treatise Bhogakārikā or “Stanzas of Experience”, Sadyojyoti 
claims that liberation (mokṣa) is the contrary (viśleṣa) of experience (bhoga). It is noteworthy, 
however, that this idea of an affectless, passive, and pure Self certainly comes from the period of the 
development of ascetic or śramaṇa orders (5th century BD), as in the cases of Buddhism, Jainism, 
Ajīvikas, and others, which constitutes an important transition period in Indian religions and 
philosophies, from the active paradigm of Vedic rituals to the introspective paradigm of renunciate 
way of life that is already reflected in several upaniṣadic texts. As Geoffrey Samuel (2008:135) 
pointed out: “Bronkhorst suggests that members of this culture were working on the basic 
assumption that action leads to misery and rebirth. 'In this tradition some attempted to abstain from 
action, literally, while others tried to obtain an insight that their real self, their soul, never partakes 
of any action anyhow' (1993:128)”. At any rate, to conceive our own mental life as mechanical and 
external involves, undoubtedly, an innovative way of self-exploring the frontiers between our 
mental states and the phenomenon of our consciousness. But in the same way as Cartesian dualism 
could not explain the interaction between the mind and the world (and this includes, indeed, the 
body), Sāṃkhya philosophy is also left without explanation as to how the association between 
puruṣa and prakṛti is established. Instead, Sāṃkhya restricts itself to diagnosing the cause of 
suffering and teaching us how to remove it through a particular meditative analysis, which includes, 
as a first step, the mental inference (anumāna; SK 5-6) of each one of the twenty-three prakṛti's 
pieces, as well as their mechanical functions in our mental map. Finally, this will lead us to infer the 
primary dualism which reigns over the experience. Knowledge acquired by ordinary means such as 
perception, inference or reliable verbal testimony is called pramā. Thus, a certain pramā is 
necessary to achieve the subtlest discernment or jñāna. Nevertheless, this kind of final knowledge 
(jñāna) is neither the result of any ordinary way of learning (pramāṇa) nor the consequence of any 
intellectual inquiry. Although the soteriological path is described by using epistemic terms, it is 
important to keep in mind which kind of knowledge Sāṃkhya and Yoga are referring to. Once the 
experience is at the service of the consciousness, and all the mental processes have been recognized 
and driven by it, the separation of the two principal categories seems to arrive by means of a 
meditative self-research. Although Īśvarakṛṣṇa does not mention the word samādhi, and there is not 
any particular method of meditation included in Sāṃkhyakārikā, we have tried to show that there 
may still be good reasons to rethink the Sāṃkhya system as a philosophy strongly engaged with an 
introspective pursuit of the individual's deepest and most slippery frontiers. 
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